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Tonga’s 2006 National Committee on Political 
Reform (NCPR) recommended an increase 
in the number of people’s representatives in 
the Legislative Assembly from nine to 17, a 
proposal that would, for the first time, entail 
a majority popularly elected parliament 
in Tonga. The 2007 Tripartite Committee 
on Political Reform (2007), which brought 
together representatives of the government, 
the people’s representatives and nobles, 
endorsed the NCPR’s proposals—likewise 
recommending increasing the number of 
people’s representatives from nine to 17, 
while retaining the nine representatives of 
the nobles alongside four parliamentarians 
nominated by the King (instead of the 15 
cabinet members directly nominated by the 
King at present). Amid these deliberations, 
there have been important questions raised 
about the choice of electoral system. The 
three options considered were 
retaining the present   mixed block-voting 
and first-past-the-post system 
  shifting to a first-past-the-post system 
with single-member districts 
  shifting to a single-transferable vote 
system. 
Several other possibilities exist but these 
three represent sensible and feasible options. 
Many of the other widely used electoral 
systems would be worthy of consideration 
only in the context of a well-developed 
political party-based system, which Tonga 
does not have at present. All three of the 
systems under consideration operate fairly 
well without political parties; however, 
all three can also operate effectively with 
political parties, should these emerge. 
Building in this kind of flexibility seems 
sensible in contemporary Tonga, since some 
observers anticipate the development of a 
political party-based system in the future 
while others do not. 
The purpose of this article is to examine 
these three options and to consider which 
might best suit the country during a period 
of radical reform in the composition of 
parliament. 
 
Retaining the present mixed 
block-voting and first-past-thepost 
system 
Tonga’s current voting system for the nine 
people’s representatives is a mixture of 
two systems. In the international electoral 
systems literature, it would be categorised 
as a combination of the ‘first-past-thepost’ 
and the ‘block-vote’ systems. First198 
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past-the-post systems use single-member 
constituencies, in which the candidate 
with the largest number of votes wins. 
Where there is more than one member 
per constituency, this is called the ‘block 
vote’. At present, Tonga has three multimember 
block-voting constituencies and 
two single-member first-past-the-post 
constituencies. Tongatapu elects three 
people’s representatives, while Ha’apai and 
Vava’u elect two people’s representatives, 
using a block-voting system. ’Eua and, to 
the far north, the Niuas (Niuafo’ou and 
Niuatoputapu) each has a single member 
in the Legislative Assembly. 
First-past-the-post and block-voting 
systems are reasonably simple to count and 
straightforward for the voter to understand. 
Eligible voters mark a tick on the ballot 
paper next to their favoured candidate or 
candidates. Candidates with the largest 
number of votes win. 
The block-vote system is used in several 
other small islands worldwide (for example, 
Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Jersey, 
Kuwait, Saint Helena, Tuvalu, Mauritius 
and the Maldives). It is rarer in larger 
countries or countries with established 
political party systems. 
Block-voting systems are sometimes 
criticised for advantaging parties, groups 
or factions that have only a slight electoral 
advantage and heavily penalising those 
groups that have substantial minority 
support. For example, in a three-member 
constituency such as present-day Tongatapu, 
if one group manages to have 52 per cent 
of electors vote for three candidates, it is 
likely to win all three seats. Another group, 
even if it receives 48 per cent of the vote, 
might gain no seats at all. As a result, there 
might be no opposition in parliament. 
This is also a potential danger with firstpast- 
the-post systems, and is known as 
‘disproportionality’—meaning that the 
share of seats won is very different from 
the share of the vote secured by a party 
or political grouping. The risks of severe 
disproportionality tend to be higher with 
larger constituencies (Taagepera and Shugart 
1989:23). Concerns about disproportionality, 
however, make sense only when candidates 
group together in support of positions or 
form political parties, rather than operating as 
separate independents, without any common 
affiliations.1 In circumstances where such 
party or group coherence exists, the blockvote 
system tends to reward disciplined 
parties or groups and penalises those with 
looser control over their supporters. 
If the first group were to put up more than 
three candidates in Tongatapu, it would be 
less likely to win all three seats. Supporters 
might spread their votes too broadly across 
the candidates, thereby allowing the 48 per 
cent group to take some or all of the seats. 
In practice, however, the block vote often 
has the reverse reputation because political 
parties are unable to keep their supporters 
disciplined. In Thailand, for example, it was 
seen as encouraging greater rivalry within 
groups, triggering a proliferation of political 
parties and generating short-lived and 
unstable coalition governments. As a result, 
the system was abandoned in Thailand in 
1997, in a move sometimes credited with 
diminishing the number of political parties 
and encouraging the emergence of issuebased 
national politics (Hicken 2005:383–5; 
2006:105–7). 
The block-vote system is also sometimes 
seen as generating incentives for increased 
rivalry among candidates competing for the 
same seat, and so potentially diminishing 
the potential for post-election coalitions. As 
one observer of the 2005 polls on Tongatapu 
indicated: ‘in an electoral system where 
each voter has three votes a candidate will 
improve his chances if he can bleed votes 
from more than one rival; attracting votes 
to a running mate is therefore sound tactics’ 
(Campbell 2006:56). 
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In other words, the system generates 
incentives for rivalry and, if sufficient 
discipline can be established, alliances. 
In the existing non-party circumstances 
in Tonga, there are several good reasons 
for retaining the block-vote system but 
expanding the number of members per 
constituency. The difficulties of subdividing 
islands, simplicity, the preference for 
counting at polling stations rather than 
centrally and the absence of a party-based 
system are factors that favour the block 
vote. If Tonga were to retain a block-voting 
system and increase the number of people’s 
representatives in some constituencies, 
consideration should be given to the 
consequences of using the block vote in the 
much larger constituencies.2 The largest 
constituency, Tongatapu, might best be 
subdivided into three or four smaller multimember 
constituencies. If a party system 
develops and if problems of vote/seat 
disproportionality ensue, the issue of which 
electoral system is best for Tonga might be 
revisited and other options entertained. 
There seems little to be achieved by making 
such changes before the advent of political 
parties. 
Shifting to a first-past-the-post 
system with single-member 
districts 
Another option considered by the Tripartite 
Committee was to shift to a fully fledged 
first-past-the-post system. This would entail 
a move to single-member constituencies, 
requiring a Constituency Boundaries 
Commission to subdivide the current 
multi-member constituencies, at least on 
the three larger islands: Tongatapu, Vava’u 
and Ha’apai. 
For example, Tongatapu currently has 
three of the nine people’s representatives 
(33.3 per cent), while the island is home 
to 70.5 per cent of Tonga’s population, 
according to the 2006 Census. Together 
with an increase in the number of people’s 
representatives, it would be sensible to 
allocate a larger proportion of seats to 
Tongatapu. Under a first-past-the-post 
system, the island would probably have to 
include separate constituencies for urban 
Nuku’alofa and the rural areas would be 
criss-crossed with boundaries, perhaps 
covering eastern, western and central 
Tongatapu. The precise formula would 
depend on the number of seats to be 
allocated to Tongatapu. 
The Cook Islands made such a 
change from multi-member block-voting 
constituencies to first-past-the-post singlemember 
electorates in 1981. There it was 
credited with encouraging a more parochial 
style of politics, with members becoming 
more responsive to local concerns and 
pressures and neglecting nation-wide 
issues. According to Ron Crocombe and Jon 
Tikivanotau Jonassen (2004): 
In 1981, ‘large’ electorates with 
multiple members were replaced by 
the same number of MPs in singlemember 
electorates. This attracted 
more parochial politicians, and small 
electorates encouraged all politicians 
to be more parochial…As no one is 
elected at even the level of one island 
on the larger islands, or nationally, 
there are no incentives to take a 
national perspective. 
Other countries with first-past-the-post 
systems, such as the United Kingdom, are 
not noticeably more parochial or locally 
focused than those countries with multimember 
constituencies. Where members 
represent island-wide constituencies, as 
in Tuvalu, it has not avoided claims of a 
narrowly focused ‘islandism’.3 Whether or 
not politicians assume a national perspective 
may therefore be unrelated to the electoral 
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system. It may be due to other political 
factors. 
In Tonga, other features of the emerging 
political system encourage at least those 
members who join the government to take 
a national perspective. With the entry of 
some people’s representatives into cabinet, 
by-elections have been held in their former 
constituencies. As they become ministers, 
they have been deemed to join the ranks 
of members appointed by the King. In so 
doing, by convention, they are expected 
to take a more national perspective, with 
those selected in the resulting by-elections 
assuming their former constituency 
representation roles. This feature of the 
political system, however, may be altered 
as Tonga shifts the balance towards a 
cabinet comprising a larger proportion 
of elected members. Elsewhere in the 
Pacific and in countries with Westminsterinfluenced 
political systems, ministers more 
usually remain representatives of specific 
constituencies and do not lose their seats 
in parliament. 
In some circumstances, having an 
electoral system that strengthens local ties 
between a member of parliament and his 
or her constituents is considered one of 
the merits of the first-past-the-post system, 
whereas multi-member, constituencybased 
electoral systems are criticised for 
loosening that connection and leaving 
constituents uncertain about who ‘their’ 
representative is. Under Tonga’s existing 
system, the problems often associated with 
multi-member constituencies are not widely 
raised, perhaps because even the largest 
constituency, Tongatapu, has only three 
members. 
There is often room for healthy debate 
about the ‘effects’ of electoral systems 
since other factors—such as the presence 
or absence of strong political parties, the 
resilience of island-wide solidarity or the 
existence of cross-cutting allegiances or 
church pressures—also influence the way 
politics is conducted. 
Under the existing system, voters 
sometimes adopt ‘tamate fika’ (or ‘killing 
numbers’) tactics—that is, they cast a 
vote for their favoured candidate and 
then deliberately squander other votes on 
‘no-hope’ candidates to avoid supporting 
contenders who might oust their favourite. 
Even where careful strategic voting of this 
kind is not used, ‘impulse voting’ often 
characterises the second or third vote lodged 
(that is, these votes are given to linked 
kinsfolk or friends as gestures, whether or 
not they are likely to win). If widespread, 
such tactics would be best dealt with by a 
shift to a first-past-the-post-system. There 
are, however, some systems that enable 
voters to indicate preferences on the ballot 
paper and to make it unlikely that their most 
favoured candidate will be disadvantaged 
by their also indicating support for other 
candidates. 
Shifting to a single-transferable 
vote system 
Another option considered by the Tripartite 
Committee on Political Reform was the 
‘single-transferable vote system’ (STV), 
sometimes known in Australia as the 
Hare-Clark system. This is a preferential 
voting system used in multi-member 
constituencies. It is a complex system and is 
used in Ireland, Malta and, for upper house 
elections, in Australia (Bowler and Grofman 
2000). This system requires voters to rank 
candidates ‘1, 2, 3, 4’, and so on. 
STV can be used with optional marking 
of preferences (as in Ireland and Malta) or 
it can be used with compulsory marking of 
preferences (as for the Australian Senate). In 
the latter case, if a voter does not indicate 
preferences, his or her vote is considered 
invalid (or informal) and is not counted. 
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How does the STV system work? 
Initially, the number of first-preference votes 
is tallied and a quota is established that 
indicates the number of votes required for 
a candidate to cross the threshold of victory. 
The so-called ‘droop’ quota is determined 
by the formula 
Votes/(seats + 1) +1. 
(1) 
The first-preference votes for each 
candidate are then counted. Any candidate 
that reaches the threshold at the first count 
is elected. If none reaches that threshold or if 
seats remain to be filled, at the second count 
the lowest polling candidate is eliminated 
and his or her votes are redistributed in 
accordance with the second preferences 
shown on the ballot paper. In addition, if 
one candidate exceeds the threshold and is 
elected, his or her ‘surplus’ votes above the 
threshold are redistributed in accordance 
with the second preferences marked on the 
ballot paper.4 
If no candidate reaches the threshold 
or if seats remain to be filled at the second 
count, the process of eliminating the lowest 
polling candidates and redistributing 
preferences, and recycling any surpluses, 
continues until all seats are filled (or until 
all the preferences are exhausted, in which 
case the candidate with the largest number 
of votes wins). This often entails a large 
number of successive recounts. 
Some debate exists about whether 
STV, which is a candidate-centred system, 
stimulates rivalry within political parties or 
affiliated groups, and whether it encourages 
incumbent politicians to focus too much on 
their constituencies rather than focusing 
on scrutinising and enacting legislation at 
the national level. The Republic of Ireland 
is the most frequently cited example of 
‘localism’ and ‘short-termism’ associated 
with STV. Some commentators have, 
however, contested these claims, pointing 
out that Irish parties are reasonably cohesive 
and that factors other than the electoral 
system could be responsible for ‘localism’ in 
Irish politics (Gallagher 2005:73–4). There is 
little sign that STV has triggered excessive 
intra-party competition in Ireland or Malta, 
where STV coexists with reasonably robust 
party-based systems (Hirczy de Mi o and 
Lane 2000:178–204). Some commentators 
have criticised STV for giving first, second 
and subsequent preferences an equal 
value, on the grounds that lower-order 
preferences should be worth less than a 
first preference. This is the case with the 
Nauruan system, where a first preference 
is worth ‘one’, a second preference ‘half’, 
a third preference ‘one-third’, and so on. 
Instead of progressively eliminating the 
lowest-polling candidates, Nauru simply 
tallies all the preferences to establish the 
winners. 
A hypothetical example of STV in Tonga 
It is impossible to show exactly how STV 
might work in practice in Tonga because, 
at present, ballots cast do not indicate 
voter preferences. For illustrative purposes, 
however, let us consider how the STV 
system might work for Tonga’s largest 
constituency, the three-member Tongatapu 
constituency. To make this possible, let us 
imagine that all voters marked their ballot 
papers in 2005 with the real top-three 
candidates as, respectively, first, second and 
third preferences. 
On Tongatapu, there were 51,780 votes 
cast at the 2005 election. The ‘droop quota’ 
would therefore be established as follows 
51,780/(3 + 1) = 12,945 + 1 = 12,946. 
(2) 
To win, a candidate would have to 
receive 12,946 votes. On Tongatapu in 2005, 
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there were 29 candidates who contested the 
election (Table 1). The candidate with the 
largest number of votes was ’Akilisi Pohiva, 
who received 11,225 votes. This was 1,721 
votes short of the 12,946 threshold. The 
lowest-polling candidate was Lolo Mataele, 
with 89 votes. At the second count, Mataele 
would be eliminated, and his votes would 
be redistributed according to the second 
preferences shown on his ballot papers. 
Even if all of those 89 ballot papers showed 
’Akilisi Pohiva as second preference, 
Pohiva would still not reach the required 
threshold of 12,946. Thus, further rounds 
of counting, and elimination of the lowestpolling 
candidates, would be required to 
determine the first victor. The hypothetical 
sequence of eliminations and the manner 
of redistributions is calculated (Table 1), 
with those tallies that change at each count 
shown in bold font. 
Ten candidates would need to be 
eliminated before ’Akilisa Pohiva would be 
declared the first victor at the eleventh count. 
The number two people’s representative 
would be established after 19 candidates 
had been eliminated, and the number three 
people’s representative would be established 
after the elimination of 22 candidates. In 
total, 23 counts would be necessary. At the 
final count, four unsuccessful candidates 
would remain in the contest. This is because, 
even if gathered together, their 12,681 
combined votes would not be sufficient 
to overturn the 13,207 votes secured by 
the number three people’s representative. 
Their votes would therefore be ‘wasted’ 
in the sense that they did not serve to elect 
any candidate. If there were a shift from 
the current three-member constituency to a 
larger constituency, more than 29 candidates 
may stand. If so, a larger number of counts 
might be necessary. 
It is important to re-emphasise that this 
exercise is for illustrative purposes only. In 
real-world situations, eliminated candidates’ 
preferences would be spread more widely, 
and would not be concentrated on the top 
candidates at the first count. One of the key 
features of STV and other such preferential 
voting systems is that a candidate who 
polls the largest number of first-preference 
votes can end up losing the election. If he 
or she receives few high preferences, other 
candidates can come from behind and 
leap-frog over a first-count leader to win 
the election. Indeed, if STV persistently 
produced the same result as Tonga’s current 
system (as in our hypothetical example), 
there would be little to be achieved by 
an electoral system change. In practice, 
one would expect a significant number of 
first-count leaders to be dislodged after the 
counting of preferences. 
The pros and cons of STV in Tonga 
The STV system has been recommended 
as ‘the most appropriate voting system for 
Tonga’ on the grounds that other options 
entail the presence of political parties, 
because they could yield disproportionate 
outcomes if parties develop or because they 
entail a difficult subdivision of existing 
constituencies (Salmond 2002:171–92). On 
the larger Tongan islands, voters are familiar 
with indicating more than just one favoured 
candidate on the ballot paper, even if they 
do not mark these in order of preference. 
So, in this sense, the system might be well 
received. Other Pacific island countries use 
preferential voting systems, including Fiji, 
Papua New Guinea and Nauru, but none 
uses the STV system. The crucial question of 
whether the marking of preferences should 
be compulsory or optional has not been 
widely considered. 
In response to the objection that the 
STV system would be a rather complicated 
method of electing members to the 
Legislative Assembly, it has been said that 
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[t]he new system only needs to be 
fully understood by a small number of 
returning officers. Voters need only be 
aware that their vote is almost never 
wasted, regardless of who they vote 
for, and that the results of the process 
are a fair reflection of the electorate’s 
overall support for each candidate. 
Most people do not know all the 
inner workings of their car’s engine, 
but they are happy to drive the car 
anyway. So it is with electoral systems. 
(Salmond 2002:185) 
To pursue the analogy, even when they 
are imported fully assembled, cars need 
regular servicing by mechanics just as 
electoral offices need to run general elections 
every three or more years. Electoral officials 
need to know how to count the votes. The 
complexity of the count can make the STV 
system difficult to operate for electoral 
officials, particularly if, as at present in 
parts of Tonga, votes are still recorded and 
tallied by hand rather than using computer 
programs. Counting could no longer be 
conducted at the polling stations, but would 
need to be centralised (Reynolds, Reilly 
and Ellis, 2005:77), potentially reducing the 
transparency associated with village-level 
monitoring of electoral administration. In 
neighbouring Fiji, where a single-member 
version of STV called the ‘alternative 
vote’ is used, problems have arisen due to 
frequent errors by electoral officers in the 
distribution of preferences.5 To manage 
such a system would require substantial 
capacity strengthening at the Tongan 
Elections Office and considerable overseas 
technical assistance. Those recommending 
electoral system changes who neglect the 
institutional context in which the system 
will operate could unintentionally open the 
path to major on-the-ground difficulties. 
Second, just as some customers prefer 
manual cars, which they learn how to 
operate themselves, wise administrators 
might prefer a transparent and easily 
comprehensible system. Understanding 
how the count worked—and why winners 
won and losers lost—could be important, 
particularly in circumstances where there 
were uncertainties about the legitimacy 
of electoral processes. In the aftermath 
of political convulsions, or where major 
controversies exist about the composition 
of governments, such issues are particularly 
significant. Systems in which everyone 
understands and, even if they are on the 
losing side, accepts the rules tend to produce 
more legitimate outcomes than those that 
work in mysterious and impenetrable ways. 
In other words, electoral systems are not 
really like cars at all. They are facilitative 
frameworks for translating votes cast into 
seats won that need to be carefully woven 
into the social and institutional fabric of 
societies. 
Where first count leaders have been 
overtaken by those coming from behind, 
who may have obtained only a small 
number of votes at the first count, this 
often leads to political controversies and 
complaints that preferential voting systems 
are ‘unfair’. Other commentators respond 
that such systems are ‘fairer’ because they 
minimise the number of ‘wasted votes’ 
and ensure that those elected have broad 
support. 
If Tonga were to adopt STV, it would 
be likely that some constituencies would 
still have single members and would 
therefore find themselves with the singlemember 
equivalent of STV, the so-called 
alternative vote (AV) system, as in Fiji and 
Papua New Guinea. ’Eua and the Niuas 
would probably retain single-member 
districts even if the overall number of seats 
for people’s representatives substantially 
increased. Other electorates, such as Vava’u 
and Ha’apai, although using STV, would 
probably have fewer than the minimum 
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29 candidates: First 
Count 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 07. Samuela ’Akilisi Pohiva 11,225 11,314 11,444 11,577 11,735 11,904 12,084 12,279 12,484 12,718 18. ’Isileli Pulu, 
Ma’ufanga, incumbent 8,110 8,110 8,110 8,110 8,110 8,110 8,110 8,110 8,110 8,110 22. Feleti Vaka’uta Sevele, Ma’ufanga 7,585 7,585 7,585 
7,585 7,585 7,585 7,585 7,585 7,585 7,585 28. William Clive Edwards, Kolofo’ou 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619 
3,619 02. Fuiva Ruby Adeline Kavaliku, Ha’ateiho 3,219 3,219 3,219 3,219 3,219 3,219 3,219 3,219 3,219 3,219 14. Mateitalo F. Mahu’inga, 
Pea 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 30. Lopeti Senituli, Fahefa 2,883 2,883 2,883 2,883 2,883 2,883 2,883 
2,883 2,883 2,883 11. Semisi Kailahi, Holonga 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 01. Semisi P. I. Tapueluelu, 
Talafo’ou 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 27. Simione Kau Silapelu, Ma’ufanga 1,569 1,569 1,569 1,569 1,569 
1,569 1,569 1,569 1,569 1,569 31. Mateaki Heimuli, Kolomotu’a 1,431 1,431 1,431 1,431 1,431 1,431 1,431 1,431 1,431 1,431 04. ’Alisi 
Pone Fotu, Kolofo’ou 998 998 998 998 998 998 998 998 998 998 03. Mumui Tatola, Kolomotu’a 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 
24. Sela Lopa Kaisinga, Kolofo’ou 522 522 522 522 522 522 522 522 522 522 17. Kamipeli Tofa’imala’e’aloa, Haveluloto 393 393 393 393 
393 393 393 393 393 393 16. ’Alani Fisher Taione, Vaini 372 372 372 372 372 372 372 372 372 372 06. Tupou Malohi, Kolonga 325 325 325 
325 325 325 325 325 325 325 19. Siosifa Filini Sikuea, Tofoa 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 10. Siale Christopher Kava, 
Haveluloto 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 09. ’Aisake Fa’alongo Filimone, Nukunuku 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 
12. Salesi Kauvaka, Ha’utu 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 elim 
26. Sione Tu’i’onetoa, Makaunga 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 elim 
08. Hoatatau Tenisi, Tokomololo 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 elim 
05. Penisila Save, Ha’akame 180 180 180 180 180 180 elim 
21. Lesinali Tovo Faleafa, Kolomotu’a 169 169 169 169 169 elim 
13. Kelepi V. Lamipeti, Makaunga 158 158 158 158 elim 
25. Semisi Nauto Tu’apasi ’Ata’ata, Kolofo’ou 133 133 133 elim 
20. Taholo Lelea Kolovai 130 130 elim 
15. Sione Lolo Mataele, Te’ekiu 89 elim 
Totals 51,780 
Table 1 Hypothetical illustration of the operation of STV in the three-member Tongatapu 
2005 constituency 
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11 Surplus 
transfer 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Surplus 
transfer 
21 22 23 
12,956 victor 1 
8,110 8,120 8,375 8,634 8,959 9,331 9,724 10,246 10,971 11,969 13,400 victor 2 
7,585 7,585 7,585 7,585 7,585 7,585 7,585 7,585 7,585 7,585 7,585 8,039 9,608 11,194 13207 victor3 
3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619 3619 
3,219 3,219 3,219 3,219 3,219 3,219 3,219 3,219 3,219 3,219 3,219 3,219 3,219 3,219 3219 
2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2960 
2,883 2,883 2,883 2,883 2,883 2,883 2,883 2,883 2,883 2,883 2,883 2,883 2,883 2,883 2883 
2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 elim 
1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 elim 
1,569 1,569 1,569 1,569 1,569 1,569 1,569 1,569 1,569 1,569 1,569 1,569 elim 
1,431 1,431 1,431 1,431 1,431 1,431 1,431 1,431 1,431 1,431 elim 
998 998 998 998 998 998 998 998 998 elim 
725 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 elim 
522 522 522 522 522 522 522 elim 
393 393 393 393 393 393 elim 
372 372 372 372 372 elim 
325 325 325 325 elim 
259 259 259 elim 
255 255 elim 
elim 
elim. = eliminated 
Notes: All eliminated candidates’ ballots assumed to rank the top three first-count candidates as 1, 2 and 3. The 
‘droop quota’ is 12,946, meaning that no candidate is declared a victor until they reach that threshold. 
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five seats per constituency, which is often 
thought necessary to yield a proportional 
result (Taagepera and Shugart 1989), in 
the process diminishing one of the major 
benefits commonly associated with STV. 
Whether to make the marking of 
preferences compulsory or optional makes 
a major difference to preferential-voting 
systems. Where preferences are optional, 
voters often choose only to ‘plump’ for a 
single most-favoured candidate (Punnett 
1986:35). They opt to mark only a ‘1’ on the 
ballot paper and to not record a ‘2’, ‘3’, or 
‘4’, and so on. Where lodging preferences is 
compulsory, voters are required to rank in 
order a certain number or percentage of the 
candidates (for example, three candidates 
must be so ranked in Papua New Guinea 
and 75 per cent of the candidates must be 
ranked in Fiji). 
Under the present system in Tonga, 
multiple voting is compulsory in the sense 
that voters must lodge three preferences on 
Tongatapu and two on Ha’apai and Vava’u to 
cast a valid vote. Sometimes, as we see above, 
voters have only a strong first preference and 
therefore deliberately cast their second and 
third preferences for no-hope candidates 
(tamate fika), so as not to endanger their first 
choice by promoting potential rivals. 
In countries where recording preferences 
is compulsory, large numbers of invalid 
votes have sometimes been recorded.6 This 
is particularly common where voters are 
required to rank in order a very large number 
of candidates to cast a valid ballot. If many 
voters plump only for first-choice candidates 
or fail to rank all candidates, electoral systems 
such as STV and AV can work similarly to the 
block-vote or first-past-the-post systems. 
To deal with this, a complex ballot 
paper has sometimes been adopted (as, for 
example, in Fiji or the Australian upper 
house elections), giving voters the option 
of simply indicating a preference for a 
political party (so-called ‘ticket voting’). 
Such votes are taken to endorse lists of 
preferences specified by the political parties. 
Many observers, however, believe that this 
destroys the advantages of preferentialvoting 
systems and gives too much power 
to political party officials. 
Conclusion 
Three electoral systems that might work 
reasonably well in the Tongan context 
have been considered. These are also the 
three options that have been discussed 
most frequently within Tonga. On balance, 
there is a strong case for retaining the 
existing mixed block-vote/first-past-thepost 
system and (assuming that the number 
of people’s representatives is increased) for 
increasing the number of constituencies for 
the Tongatapu electorate. Another option is 
to shift to single-member districts, using a 
first-past-the-post system. There is, however, 
no indication of widespread antagonism 
towards the existing multi-member 
constituencies and such a change could, in 
some cases, reduce MPs’ focus on islandwide 
or national issues. The third option, 
of adopting a multi-member, preferential 
voting system—the single-transferable 
vote—on the grounds that this can happily 
accommodate political parties should these 
emerge, makes the choice of electoral design 
dependent on accommodating hypothetical 
possibilities. Should political parties emerge 
in the future or should hitherto unknown 
objections against the existing electoral 
system become widespread, the question 
of which electoral system is best for Tonga 
should be revisited. 
Notes 
1 For these reasons, Salmond’s suggestion that 
a proportional-representation system should 
be adopted for Tonga because if a party 
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system were to develop then there would 
likely be problems of disproportionality 
seems to put the cart before the horse. He 
writes that ‘with the probable growth of a 
political party system in Tonga, the current 
voting mechanism of simple plurality voting 
in multi-member constituencies should be 
altered. This is because of the excessively 
disproportional results of this mechanism in 
a system of active political parties’ (Salmond 
2002:183). Development of a political partybased 
system has, however, not been an 
inevitable accompaniment of electoral 
democracy in the Pacific islands (see Fraenkel 
2006). The better approach would be to wait 
and see if the problem identified is or is not 
severe if a party system should emerge. Not 
only does Salmond claim that Tonga is ‘on 
the brink of developing a party political 
system’ (2002:184), he predicts that it will be 
a multi-party system, rather than a system in 
which a single party establishes hegemony: 
‘the nature of the Tongan system at present 
is such that a single party majority would 
not be returned regardless of the electoral 
system’ (2002:185). How can one be certain of 
this outcome, as opposed to the alternative, 
as witnessed in neighbouring Samoa, where 
the Human Rights Protection Party emerged 
from a previous no-party context and now 
dominates the political stage? 
2 In Palestine, where the block vote was adopted 
in 1995, one of the largest constituencies was 
Gaza, with 12 members. In 1996, voters in 
Gaza had to cope with a ballot paper about 
1 metre long to handle the 87 contestants. 
Palestine replaced the block-vote system with 
a mixed system ahead of the 2006 election. 
3 Tuvalu has eight island-wide constituencies, 
with seven members elected from seven 
islands on a block-voting basis, and one 
elected from one island on a first-past-thepost 
basis (see Panapa and Fraenkel 2008). 
4 This is further complicated by the fact 
that the ‘surplus’ votes to be recycled are 
often not arbitrarily chosen. Instead, all the 
victor’s ballot papers are redistributed at a 
fraction of their face value. For example, if 
a candidate had 20 votes, and the threshold 
for victory was 15, all 20 ballot papers would 
be examined and the preferences indicated 
calculated at one-quarter of their face value 
in order to transfer the five remaining votes to 
the candidates remaining in the contest. 
5 In Fiji, such miscounting resulted in one 
court case in the Tailevu North/Ovalau Open 
constituency after the 1999 election (see High 
Court of Fiji 1999). Other errors are discernible 
in the published results for 1999, 2001 and 2006, 
although in most cases they are not sufficiently 
large to change the final result. 
6 Australia, for example, witnessed Senate 
elections in which more than 10 per cent of 
votes were discounted as invalid before the 
introduction of ticket voting in 1984 (Hughes 
2000:162). In Fiji, which has ticket voting, 9 
per cent of votes were declared invalid at the 
elections of 1999 and 2006, and 12 per cent were 
declared invalid in 2001. 
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